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AN EAST ASIAN APPROACH TO
HUMAN RIGHTS*
Bilahari Kim Hee P.S. Kausikan*
Is there, or can there be, a distinctively Asian approach to
human rights? On one level, the answer must logically be no if
human rights are those rights which everyone has simply by being
human. Yet, cultural diversity is also a reality. As a matter of
empirical record, rights, order and justice are obtained in diverse
ways in different countries at different times. Japan is an Asian
country that professes adherence to democracy and human rights in
terms almost indistinguishable from the West. Nevertheless, the way
in which Japan conceives and implements laws is different from the
method employed by other Asian and Western countries. These
differences can be attributed to Japan's culture and level of
development.
I. THE DIVERSITY OF ASIA
Cultural diversity as an empirical fact points to the central
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difficulty of conceiving of a single Asian approach to human rights.
Asia is a vast and diverse region. Different voices say different things
with different motivations. The contrast is even greater if we take
into account not just governments, but also non-governmental
organizations, minority, ethnic and religious groups. Consequently,
the debate over the proper approach to human rights is not just
between Asia and the West, but also between and within Asian
countries.
My emphasis is on the governmental perspective in the on-
going human rights debate with the West. From this viewpoint, an
Asian approach to human rights is perhaps more a matter of process
rather than particular outcomes. There is general disquiet across the
region, not just governments, with allowing the West determine the
international human rights agenda as it has for many years. Common
sets of questions are being asked across Asia, even if there are no
common answers.
In this article, I address four aspects of this complex debate:
first, the central question of universality -- the heart of the human
rights debate with the West; second, the relationship between
development and human rights; third, the western reaction to this
debate; and fourth, how the West and Asian governments can find a
more common ground. Please keep in mind that what is presented
here is only one Asian point of view.
II. THE IDEAL OF UNIVERSALITY
Are all human rights really universal? This question is often,
somewhat crudely, posed in the form of a dichotomy between
universality and cultural relativism, provoking fierce disputes with a
pronounced theological flavor. I believe that this is a false and sterile
dichotomy.
A. Culture is No Excuse
Too many in the West perceive cultural relativism as nothing
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more than a disguise for dictators. It cannot be denied that gross
violators of human rights are among those who advance this
argument. There is a global culture of modernity of which the ideal
of human rights is part. No traditional culture exists in a pure form
anymore, anywhere. No country has rejected the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter Universal Declaration).
Recognition of diversity as an empirical fact cannot justify gross
violation of human rights. Murder is murder whether perpetrated in
America, Asia or Africa. No country claims torture as part of its
culture heritage. Everyone has a right to be recognized as a person
before the law.
B. Not Everything Is Really Universal
Some rights must be enjoyed by all human beings everywhere
in a civilized world. All cultures aspire to promote human dignity in
their own ways. In fact, universality as an ideal is not widely
disputed, even in Asia. The hard core of rights, however, that are
truly universal is smaller than some would assert. Most rights are still
essentially contested concepts. There may be a general consensus,
but this is coupled with continuing and no less important conflicts of
interpretation. Rights will be implemented in different ways.
C. We Are Not All the Same
Universality is not uniformity. The extent and exercise of
rights and freedoms is a product of the historical experiences of
particular peoples and therefore, vary from one culture or political
community to another, and over time. Many Asian societies are more
group-oriented and more accepting of a wider sphere of governmental
responsibility and intervention than is common in the West. Societal
differences, however, are a reality even within the West. For
example, the U.S. has no state 'church or religion while many
European countries do. Are we to conclude that freedom of religion
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is less protected in Europe than in the U.S.? This would be absurd.'
Upon examination, the so-called "Asian challenge to
universality" is often no more than a similar assertion of the freedom
for all countries to find their own best social and political
arrangements. Curiously, this fundamentally pluralist approach is
often contested by otherwise liberal and tolerant Western individuals
who would instinctively take a multi-culturalist perspective if similar
issues were raised in their own societies.
D. All Norms Evolve
How rights were defined in Europe or America a hundred
years ago is certainly not how they are defined today. Similarly, they
will be defined differently a hundred years from now.
Almost fifty years after the Universal Declaration was adopted
as a "common standard of achievement," the debate over the meaning
of many of its thirty articles continues. The debate is not just between
the West and Asia. Not every country in the West will agree on the
specific meaning of every article. Not everyone will agree that all
articles are fundamental rights. Nor will every one of the fifty states
of the U.S. interpret the Universal Declaration in the same way.
However, the multiplicity of national, state and local laws and
practices in the U.S. is not decried as a retreat from universalism. On
the contrary, the clash and clamor of contending interests is held up
as a shining model of democratic freedom.
Universality is not a static concept. Rights, like all human
norms, evolve in response to changing configurations of interests and
needs. Irrelevant norms are discarded or modified. There is no
To give another example, in October 1995 a British judge, in marked contrast to
the way an American court handled the news media during the 0. J. Simpson trial,
threw out a case because of pretrial publicity. Are we to understand that British
courts are unfair because they do not regard the administration of justice as a form
of public entertainment? John Darnton, The Press Be Hanged! British Judge
Prefers Order in the Court, N.Y TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1995, at A l.
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reason to assume that the trend is, or ought to be, towards greater
liberalism. The right to asylum, for instance, has been progressively
restricted by most western countries in the last few years. If it had
not, the very principle might have been discarded under the political,
economic, cultural and social pressures of new mass population
movements.
It is not difficult to trace a similar evolutionary process for
many other rights and international norms. Yet, an attempt to reflect
this commonplace process in a diplomatic document aroused fierce
accusations of Asians undermining universality prior to and during
the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in June 1993.
Article 8 of the Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for
Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, also known as the
Bangkok Declaration of April 2, 1993, reads:
[Ministers and representatives of Asian governments]
recognize that while human rights are universal in
nature, they must be considered in the context of a
dynamic and evolving process of international
norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of
national and regional particularities and various
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds
Western over-reaction to this simple description of reality --
one that explicitly recognized the ideal of universality -- was perhaps
the single most important reason for the acrimony that characterized
debate between the West and Asia at the Vienna Conference.' It
2 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 157/PC/59 (1993).
' The remarks of several speakers at the World Conference on Human Rights
evidence the discord between the West and Asia. In his address on June 14, 1993,
the U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher argued that "... we cannot let
cultural relativism become the last refuge of repression." US Department of State
Dispatch, Bureau of Public Affairs, 4 (1993). American press commentary
interpreted this as a response to the alleged challenge to universality by several
Asian countries. See, for e.g., Elaine Sciolino, US Rejects Notion that Human
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continues to poison the atmosphere and fuel misunderstanding.
E. The Problem with Universality
This controversy underscores the essential problem with
universality as an ideal. Acceptance of the ideal prescribes nothing
useful about how allegedly universal rights are to be implemented in
the real world. Nor does it imply anything practical about how this
Rights Vary With Culture, N.Y TIMES, June 15, 1993, at Al.
In his address to the Conference on the same day, the Foreign Minister of
Indonesia, Ali Alatas, expressed his concern about media reports which gave:
the impression as if the success of this Conference is being
threatened by a clash of values between the developed countries
of the North and the developing countries of the South, by a
confrontation between the perceived universal, mostly Western,
concept of human rights that stresses political and civil rights,
and the purported "dissident" view, particularly of Asian
countries ...
Ali Alatas, Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Address at the World Conference on
Human Rights in Vienna (1993) (available from the Indonesian Embassy in
Washington, D.C.).
Even the Chinese delegation, which was identified as one of the prime
advocates of cultural relativism, said no more than:
The concept of human rights is a product of historical
development. It is closely associated with specific social,
political and economic conditions and the specific history,
culture and values of a particular country. Different historical
development stages have different human rights requirements.
Countries at different development stages or with different
historical traditions and cultural backgrounds also have different
understanding and practice of human rights. Thus, one should not
and cannot think the human rights standard and model of certain
countries as the only proper ones and demand all other countries
to comply with them.
Liu Huaqiu, Head of the Chinese Delegation, Speech at the World Conference on
Human Rights in Vienna (1993) (on file with the author). It is difficult to take issue
with Mr. Liu's statement. Were it not so, slavery would still be acceptable in the
U.S. and women would still be unable to vote.
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dynamic process of international norm setting is to be managed.
Singapore has had differences of opinion with several western
governments on capital punishment, corporal punishment and limits
on the freedom of expression. How are such disagreements to be
resolved? International law prescribes no single international
standard that can be applied to any of these specific issues. For
example, capital punishment is hotly debated, not just in the
international community, but even within the U.S. wherein nine states
are contemplating introducing corporal punishment. Several
European countries have limited freedom of expression through such
measures as the Official Secrets Act and stricter libel and contempt
of court laws than exist in the U.S. The days are long gone when any
single country can insist on its own practices as a "universal norm."
Clearly no country can claim immunity in another country for its
citizens because that country's norms are different. No country can
have two sets of laws, one for its own citizens and another for
foreigners.
This point is illustrated by the case of Dr. Christopher Lingle,
an American citizen who lived and worked in Singapore. In an article
published in the October 7, 1994, issue of the International Herald
Tribune, he referred, inter alia, to "intolerant regimes in the region.
relying upon a compliant judiciary to bankrupt opposition
politicians." After reading this, the Attorney-General of Singapore
instructed the police to investigate whether Dr. Lingle or any other
party had committed contempt of court or criminal defamation. As
part of their investigations, the police questioned Dr. Lingle twice.
Although he was not arrested or taken to the police station, he was
questioned in the university where he works. Dr. Lingle said that the
police had treated him with "dignity and professionalism."
The International Herald Tribune publicly apologized to the
government. Nevertheless, the International Herald Tribune and Dr.
Lingle were tried in open court, convicted of contempt of court and
fined for their actions. Some Americans responded by angrily
accusing the Singapore government of carrying out a campaign of
harassment against Dr. Lingle and attempting to intimidate him for
exercising the basic freedom of expression. From Singapore's point
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of view, however, the issue was solely whether Dr. Lingle's reference
to the judiciary had risen to the level of either contempt of court or
criminal defamation. In the context of the passage containing the
reference to "a compliant judiciary," Dr. Lingle was obviously
referring to the judiciary of a particular country. He must have
known the judiciary he was targeting.
Dr. Lingle is free to express his own point of view. Freedom
of expression, however, is not an absolute right. Similar to other
countries, Singapore has limits to the right of expression. These
limits are defined by laws which provide that contempt of court and
criminal defamation are punishable by law. The laws are derived
from British law. In Singapore, there are also clear legal limits to
freedom of expression relating to race, language and religion.
Singapore differs from many western countries which allow
their key public institutions to be attacked freely in the name of
freedom of expression. We have firmly decided that this will not be
the practice in Singapore. The Singapore government firmly believes
that in order to preserve public faith in key institutions, such as the
judiciary, it is of vital importance that their integrity be upheld. This
includes recourse to the law when an individual impugns the integrity
of any of these institutions, regardless of nationality. Consequently,
the Attorney-General had a duty to uphold the integrity of the
judiciary and to authorize investigations.
In protesting the action against Dr. Lingle, Americans --
whether they realized it or not -- gave Singapore the clear impression
that they were in fact asserting that the U.S.' concept of freedom of
speech gave immunity to an American citizen in Singapore from
being investigated for possible contempt of court and criminal
defamation of our judiciary.4
' Many Americans have difficulty understanding the unique nature of their
definition of the freedom of expression. America is probably the only country to
have elevated freedom of expression to the status of an absolute right, superseding
all others. In any case, I do not think it is only a Singaporean who would react with
some bemusement to the kind of argument presented in Rodney Smolla's book,
Free Speech in an Open Society. Smolla insists that even seemingly reasonable
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F. Universality without Responsibility
A key concept missing in the debate is that of responsibility.
This is often ignored when human rights in Asian countries are
discussed by western pundits. Another problem with universality as
an ideal is that there is no correlation with responsibility for actions
taken in the name of this ideal.
Suppose, for argument's sake, that Singapore is somehow
compelled to adopt a very liberal standard of freedom of speech that
allows public institutions to be freely attacked and denigrated, or
racist sentiments to be freely expressed, as happens in the U.S. Or
suppose that Singapore is further compelled to abolish capital or
corporal punishment. As a consequence it is possible that key
institutions would weaken, racial tensions would be fanned and the
lack of an effective deterrent would allow organized crime to become
deeply entrenched. Singapore's economic development would then
regulation of speech tends to progress inexorably towards censorship. Non-
Americans may perhaps be forgiven if they pause to catch their breath and wonder
what happened to the virtue of common sense. See RODNEY SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH
IN AN OPEN SOCIETY (1992). In fact, it is not only non-Americans who would react
in this way. Cass R. Sunstein, for example, makes the case that the absolutist
definition of the right to free speech is misguided and counter-productive. See CASS
R. SUNsTEN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
Even human rights activists and free speech advocates seem to have
difficulty in understanding the uniqueness of the American standard. When the
International Herald Tribune again apologized to the Singapore Government in a
second and separate libel case, it came under severe attack from such public interest
groups. Mr. Richard Simmons, President of the International Herald Tribune,
defended his company's position by pointing out that the critics who were
demanding that the paper try to impose America's liberal standards abroad were
uninformed. He said that the International Herald Tribune had been advised by its
lawyers that under the English libel law applicable in Singapore, it had no legal
defense. Mr. Simmons further acknowledged that "[The International Herald
Tribune] was found to have libeled people, a situation which happens with
unfortunate frequency in a large number of areas in this country and in the world,
and we will pay the price for that." William Glaberson, Newspaper Decides Not to
Fight Singapore LibelAward, N.Y. TIMES, Aug 6. 1995, at A3.
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begin to falter and fail. Singapore is a small city-state with no natural
resources. Would western pundits then be prepared to take
responsibility for bailing out Singapore, perhaps financing us for
decades, making us the fifty-first state or allowing us to join the
European Union (EU)?
My point is not that Singapore should never adopt a more
liberal standard for freedom of expression or that we should never
abolish capital or corporal punishment. It is simply that these are
choices that Singaporeans must make for themselves. Only
Singaporeans can be responsible for Singapore because they bear the
risks of such social experiments. If enough Singaporeans disagree
with the government on these issues, they will, over time, express
themselves through the ballot box, change the government and force
a modification of the law. They have not done so.
Furthermore, I am not arguing that national sovereignty
precludes all international discussions on human rights. International
law has clearly evolved to the point that how a country treats its
citizens is no longer a matter for its exclusive determination.
International human rights law co-exists uneasily, and in as yet an
unresolved manner, within the fundamental principle of national
sovereignty. It would thus be prudent to restrict such discussions to
gross and egregious violations of human rights which do not clearly
derogate national sovereignty. Attempting to expand the debate to
areas where there are legitimate national differences of interpretation
or implementation only exacerbates misunderstanding and prevents
consensus.
II. DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The relationship between development and human rights is
another aspect of the debate that is often misrepresented. The crude
argument that the enjoyment of human rights must await a certain
standard of economic development is often attributed to Asians; to be
sure, some Asians do make this argument. I do not agree with them
and I do not think that those who advance this argument are the
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majority.
It is certainly meaningless to speak of many human rights in
conditions of abject misery. There are nevertheless certain core rights
that ought not be derogated under any circumstances. For example,
poverty cannot justify murder or torture. The relationship between
development and human rights, however, is perhaps more subtle than
is sometimes appreciated.
A. Stability and Growth
Repression is wrong and unhealthy. Our experience is that
growth both promotes and is promoted by the ability of the individual
to live with dignity.
What we dispute is the simplistic belief that the extension of
individual political and civil liberties will necessarily and inevitably
lead to economic development. Nothing is inevitable. Growth and
stability are linked by a more complex and subtle dynamic: an
unremitting search for an equilibrium between the rights of the
individual, the claims of the community to which every individual
must belong, and the no less urgent need for governments to govern
effectively and for society to develop. This requires, on occasion, a
firm hand and a limitation of some individual rights in the public
interest. Our experience has convinced us that stability is necessary
for growth and the extension of human rights.
No balance between individual liberty and growth can be valid
for all countries and for all time. Every society must find its own
appropriate equilibrium if it is to progress. Our fundamental assertion
is pluralist -- the unthinking application of dogma of any kind leads
to disaster.
Singapore's experience was described by Prime Minister Goh
Chok Tong in a recent speech to the Centre for Development
Economics at Williams College. His views on "The Role of
Government in the East Asian Miracle" are relative to the instant
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discussion and merit noting in great detail.
Developing countries that attempt to follow
the economic strategies of the East Asian countries
often fail, not because they do not know what the right
economic policies are, but because they lack the
socio-political underpinnings to make such policies
stick. It is in providing these underpinnings, where
the role of government is most critical to the
development process. And the most important of the
socio-political underpinnings of economic
development are political stability and good
governance ....
What brings about political stability? The
single most important factor is good governance.
Good governance is built on three interrelated beams
and pillars. They are democratic accountability, long-
term orientation of policies and ability to achieve
social justice.
The first element, democratic accountability, implicitly
requires long-term stability. The Prime Minister acknowledged in
his speech that in order to attain this, "governments must govern with
the consent of the governed."7 Singapore, similar to most western
societies, has achieved this via "free, fair and clean elections."8 In
Singapore, elections have been held an average of every four years
during the last three decades and there is universal suffrage for all
' Goh Chok Tong, Prime Minister of Singapore, Address at the Centre for
Development Economics, Williams College, entitled The Role of Government in
the East Asian Miracle, (Sept. 16, 1995) [hereinafter The Role of Government in
the East Asian Miracle]. See also Professor S. Jayakumar, Foreign Minister of
Singapore, Address to the 16th Plenary meeting of the 50th United Nations General
Assembly, Oct. 3, 1995, U.N. GA A/50/PV.16 at 24-25.
6 The Role of Government in the East Asian Miracle, supra note 5.
7Id.
8Id.
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citizens over twenty-one years old.
As to the second factor, the long-term orientation of policies,
the Prime Minister noted how the approaches of Singapore and most
western nations differ. These differences can be attributed to the
different roles the governments fulfill in their respective societies.
According to him, the function of the U.S. government has been
traditionally limited to that "as a representative, to reflect and respond
to the express preferences of the people" which can be "vulnerable to
economic populism."9 In supporting his argument the Prime Minister
noted the difficulty the U.S. government is facing with its handling
its budget deficit. Accordingly, he emphasized that the U.S.
government, unlike smaller developing nations, can withstand such
prolonged periods of political gridlock due to its abundant resources
and broad economic base.10
This is why, in Singapore, government acts
more like a trustee. As a custodian of the people's
welfare, it exercises independent judgment on what is
in the long-term economic interests of the people and
acts on that basis. Government policy is not dictated
by opinion polls or referenda. This has sometime
meant overriding populist pressures for "easier"
economic policies. Indeed, implementing the right
policies has on occasion meant administering bitter
medicine to overcome economic challenges."'
The Prime Minister further explained that this trustee model
of government coincided with achieving democratic accountability.
Given that the government "acted as an honest and competent trustee
of the people," it has been has been voted in since every general
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in addressing Singapore's economic problems.
1 3
The ability to achieve social justice is the final element of
good governance. According to the Prime Minister, this is
accomplished in Singapore through "equal treatment of all groups and
providing those who have fallen behind with the opportunities to
catch-up. ' 4 He emphasized the government's fairness to all groups
despite ethnic, religious, economic and social affiliations and the
citizen's acceptance of its multi-racist society. 5  He further
highlighted "the government's efforts to provide every citizen with an
equal opportunity to compete and succeed" as an integral aspect of
social justice in Singapore.1
6
"3 "Long-term orientation has also been a feature of other East Asian governments.
They too have been more willing to impose short-term sacrifice in order to gain
long-term benefits. Ultimately, good governance is not just about having free and
fair elections. It is about implementing policies for long-term public good even if
such policies are unpopular in the short-term." Id.
14 Id.
15 "Government has been fair towards ethnic, religious, economic and social
groups. It is not beholden to any special interest. This is important in any society
, more so in a multi-racial one like Singapore. Everyday, children in schools recite
a pledge to become '... one united people, regardless of race, language or religion
.... ' Multi-racism is not only a pledge; it is practiced." The Prime Minister
further discussed in his speech how multi-racism has been one of the foundations
of Singapore's political stability and social cohesion. Id.
16 "While emphasizing economic efficiency and meritocracy, the government has
always been conscious of the need to prevent a gradual stratification of Singapore
society characterized by class distinctions and hatreds. But our efforts to 'level up'
society have always been motivated by the principle of equality of opportunity as
opposed to equality of outcome. Everyone should have the opportunity to run the
race, but not everyone will finish the race at the same time. This is why the
government has heavily subsidized social infrastructure; education, housing and
basic health care. But it has refrained from spending too much on social welfare;
grants, unemployment benefits and subsidies for consumption. Excessive spending
on social welfare, coupled with income redistribution through high taxation, erodes
the work ethic, discourages enterprise and weakens the family unity. On the other
hand, spending on social infrastructure provides equal opportunities for all, thereby
facilitating social mobility." Id.
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B. Values and Development
Consideration of development leads to a question of some
current notoriety: the relationship between "Asian values" and the
West. This is not a new issue. In one form or another it has engaged
intellectuals and governments in Asia for almost two centuries. Asian
values have been a balm for the cultural wounds inflicted by western
colonialism. Talking about Asian values has also been a way to
disguise the failure of some Asian societies to modernize.
The important question is not of the theoretical superiority of
Asian values, or any set of values, over any other. It is not even about
what is distinctively "Asian" about any particular set of values. In its
current manifestation, discussion of Asian values has more to do with
an on-going internal debate in many Asian societies. Having
achieved a certain measure of economic success, the question being
asked in many Asian countries, including Singapore, is how to sustain
development over the long term, keeping in mind the pitfalls and
dead-ends that many more developed societies and mature economies
are now facing in their own development. 7
Several Asian societies are searching for their own distinctive
mixture of capitalism, state and society. In talking about Asian
values, they are often only examining issues such as the responsibility
of individuals to society, the role of the family and the maintenance
of law and order. These issues are also currently being discussed and
debated by significant segments of western societies who now feel
that the exaggeration of liberal values and individual rights, devaluing
the very notion of "values," has led to serious problems.' 8
7 Many recent discussions of the subject misses the point and treats it only
tangentially. For a notable exception see DAVID I. HITCHOCK, ASIAN VALUES AND
THE US: HOW MUCH CONFLICT? (1994); see also Capitalism and Democracy in,
DIALOGUE 2-7 (1993).
"s The Republican Party in the U.S. and the Conservative Party in the U.K have
raised many analogous questions. In an academic context, Professor Amitai
Etzioni, for instance, has argued that in America and Europe the balance between
rights and duties has swung too far to the former. For a recent interesting discussion
on the devaluation of values see GETRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE DE-MORALISATION
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C. Democracy and Development
The key question raised by the debate over Asian values is
complex. As societies develop economically, must they necessarily
follow the particular path of political development that many in the
West would define as "democracy"? Many Americans instinctively
assume as a matter of faith that they must. I do not agree, although
I do not claim to have a clear answer. In fact, the point may be that
there is no simple or clear answer.
Democracy is itself a slippery term subject to multiple
meanings. Like many political terms, it bears no fixed connotation.
Everybody claims to be "democratic."' 9 As societies become more
developed economically, they become more complex. New interest
groups emerge on the scene clamoring to be heard. Established
relationships are re-ordered. Stability requires that political
arrangements accommodate such new developments in some way.
This only serves to say that things inevitably change. Whether
it necessarily leads to a particular political system is still an open
question. Whether the specific political system that many in the West
understand by the term "democracy" is intrinsically desirable, if it
requires all societies to face the serious problems of governance
confronted by the mature democracies, is also an open question.
D. Nothing Is Forever
This is not to say that governments should not be accountable
to the people through periodic free and fair elections. Accountability
is an essential condition for good government and growth, but this
does not impel any particular set of political institutions or
arrangements.
The question is simply what works, not what is prescribed by
OF SOCIETY (Alfred A. Knopf. ed., 1995).
"9 See, for e.g., C.B. MACPHERSON, THE REAL WORLD OF DEMOCRACY (1966).
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one political ideology or another. The first duty of governments is to
govern fairly, and in a way that increases the general welfare.
Communism failed not because it lacked a lofty ideal, but because in
the final analysis it could not deliver. So too will any political system
fail if it becomes, or is perceived to be, dysfunctional. No political
system or ideal is sacrosanct. Liberal democracy is certainly not the
"end of history."
Ill. THE WESTERN RESPONSE
Western response to the Asian human rights debate bears
examination because, in my view, it has been disproportionately
vehement in relation to what is actually being said by some Asians.
The universality and individuality of rights is deeply ingrained
in western political culture and the western definition of its own
identity. It is only to be expected that anything that is regarded as
even mildly questioning these "idols of the tribe" would provoke a
strong reaction. Still, the western response often seems insensitive to
the nuances of different Asian voices and selective in what it chooses
to highlight of Asian arguments. It often appears that many in the
West are responding not so much to what is actually being said, as to
their own worst fears and insecurities.
The end of the Cold War deprived the West of the convenient
ability to define its identity in opposition to the Soviet bloc. Fighting
global communism made it easy for Europeans and Americans to
believe that their common values were true and beneficial not only for
the West, but for the whole world. This cozy assumption has now
evaporated. Economic success and the removal of the Cold War
straight-jacket now allow Asian countries greater freedom to find
their own way. The West is also freer to pursue its own values, but
is not yet entirely comfortable with the post-Cold War world. Some
in the West occasionally seem disquieted by the rise of several Asian
countries as major international players that, while friendly to the
West, have no wish to become good westerners, and are strong
economic competitors. These problems are particularly acute for
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those western societies that define themselves in relation to a
universal mission.2'
Some have responded by trying to recreate the comfortable
verities of the Cold War by postulating a "clash of civilizations."
Others appear disheartened by the loss of economic competitiveness
and seemingly intractable social and political problems. They seem
to have lost the confidence to believe that their own way of life is
worth living without seeing it as obligatory for the entire human race.
I believe that the debate on "Asian values" or "Asian human
rights" has provoked such strong responses precisely because it
resonates deeply and uncomfortably with a process of questioning
once widely accepted values within many western societies.
Positions on such issues as law and order, family values and the
responsibility of individuals to society taken by some Asian
governments have become entangled with internal partisan debates,
particularly in the U.S. This is an unfortunate and unintended
complication.
The Michael Fay case illustrates this entanglement. Michael
Fay was an American teenager resident in Singapore. He was
convicted of vandalism which, in Singapore, carries a mandatory
sentence of corporal punishment. This aroused a storm of protests in
the U.S. media and from the highest levels of the Clinton
o It is often argued that the promotion of democracy and human rights has always
been a key goal of U.S. foreign policy because it is an essential part of American
self-identity. See, for e.g., TONY SMITH, AMERICA'S MISSION (1994). This may
well be true, but it is not a goal that has been pursued consistently. As Arthur
Schlensinger, Jr. has reminded us, an emphasis on such moral absolutes leads
inevitably to a double standard because there can be only one of a number of
national interests and not the overriding interest to which all else is to be
subordinated. Arthur Schlensinger, National Interests and Moral Absolutes in,
THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 102 (1986).
This is often ignored by American human rights activists and even, on
occasion, by the U.S. government. But maybe, more important is the point that how
Americans have conceived their own political culture has changed significantly in
a way that perhaps many American do not sufficiently realize. See, for e.g., DANIEL
J. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICS (1953).
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Administration. They saw corporal punishment as barbaric and
inhuman. Yet, opinion polls consistently revealed that a significant
proportion of Americans support corporal punishment.21
Two additional points are worth noting regarding the Michael
Fay case. First, it revealed not just a gap between the political and
media leadership and ordinary Americans, but a double standard so
glaring as to make one suspect contempt for foreigners to be at its
root. As pointed out earlier, defense of the ideal of universality often
leads to intolerance in otherwise liberal individuals who would take
a multi-culturalist perspective if similar issues were raised in their
own societies. The storm of protest that greeted a white American
sentenced to corporal punishment in an Asian society was not
duplicated shortly afterwards, when a seventeen year old native
American girl, Sorrel Horse, a member of the Warm Springs Indian
Group in Oregon, was flogged in front of her anguished mother by a
tribal "whipman." The girl never charged the police, never accused
in front of an American court, and never found guilty of a crime. The
U.S. media, human rights activists and American politicians were
silent.22
Second, one of the major tactics of American critics of
Singapore in the Michael Fay case was to impugn Singapore courts
and the police system as unfair and biased. This was also one of the
themes of American critics in the Lingle case discussed supra. This
contrasted starkly with the attitude taken by the Dutch Government
when one of its nationals, Johannes Van Damme, was sentenced to
death by the Singapore courts for drug trafficking. While making its
21 Of course, many of Singapore's critics sincerely believed that corporal
punishment is wrong. I can respect this belief. I cannot, however, help but suspect
that the note of hysteria that crept into some of their attacks betrayed the extent to
which confidence in their own values was shaken by the distance that the Michael
Fay case revealed between their beliefs of the political and media leadership and
many ordinary Americans.
22 See Kevin Sinclair, Canning of a Tribal Girl: American Liberals Flogged
DoubleStandard, THE STRAITS TIMES, Nov. 15, 1994 (originally printed in SouTH
CHINA MORNING POST).
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opposition to the death penalty clear, the Dutch Government was
careful to state:
The Dutch Government ascertained that the
proceedings against Mr. Van Damme were conducted
correctly and carefully. There is therefore no question
of the Netherlands criticizing the judicial process in
Singapore. The Government of the Netherlands
recognizes the sovereign right of Singapore to apply
its own laws.23
The contrast between this entirely proper approach in a far
more serious case and the hysteria over much lighter punishment
given to the Michael Fay case is surely significant. Could the
difference be because Europeans have more respect for their own
system than do Americans, who therefore find it easier to believe that
any court would be unfair? The controversy and media spectacle
surrounding the trial of O.J. Simpson and the verdict in that case may
well lead one to believe so.
IV. CONCLUSION: TowARDs CONVERGENCE
It will take some time for western societies to sort out their
internal problems and adjust psychologically to the post-Cold War
world. Since cultural differences are a reality, I do not expect that the
human rights debate between Asia and the West will be settled soon,
if ever. Nevertheless, greater convergence is possible.
The key problem is to find a balance between an often
ethnocentric and pretentious universalism and a paralyzing cultural
relativism. This will require a modest and pragmatic approach that
seeks to consolidate the common ground that can be found, while
23 Hans Van Mierlo, Foreign Affairs Minister of Netherlands, Statement on the
Execution of Johannes Van Damme (Sept. 23, 1994) (issued by the Royal
Netherlands Embassy to Singapore.)
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agreeing to disagree when necessary. It will require both sides to
eschew self-righteousness of any variety, respect diversity and accept
that disagreement is not always evidence of bad faith or malign intent.
For such an approach to work, we must confront a serious
problem that is seldom acknowledged by the human rights
community. This is the proliferation of ideals claimed or asserted to
be rights. This proliferation merely multiplies the occasion for
conflicts of interpretation or implementation without really enlarging
the consensus on human rights. The very language of rights fuels
sterile debate because it frames issues in stark, universalist and static
terms, leaving little room for compromise. The rapid multiplication
of international human rights instruments encourages a sterile
formalism as more and more states are encouraged or compelled to
accede to these treaties without the intention or capability to comply.
A focus on a more restricted but precise core of basic human
rights that must be accepted irrespective of culture or development
and that are fundamental enough to restrict the room for interpretation
is a more productive approach. We can be sure that there will be
argument over what constitutes an irreducible core. But this would
be an argument of a qualitatively different kind, more susceptible to
reasonable compromise. The non-derogable rights of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and perhaps
somewhat more controversially, the right to development, could
constitute this irreducible core.

